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Empowering United States Courts to
Hear Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court
Douglass Cassel*
I. INTRODUCTION

United States courts have only incomplete and uneven jurisdiction, most
acquired piecemeal and only in recent years, to prosecute genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity committed outside our borders. Recent developments in international law and practice-especially the
heightened commitment of democracies including the United States to end
impunity for atrocities, and the imminent prospect of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) with worldwide jurisdiction-suggest the
need to expand and rationalize the jurisdiction of U.S. courts to make it
coextensive with that of the ICC.
It now appears all but certain that the ICC will come into being in the
first years of the 21st century. A treaty to create it was approved in 1998
by a United Nations diplomatic conference in Rome, by a vote of 120 nations in favor, seven opposed and 21 abstentions.' Its initial jurisdiction
will cover genocide, crimes against humanity and serious war crimes.2
Sixty ratifications are required for the treaty to go into effect; 3 as of early
February 2000, 139 nations (including the United States) have signed the
treaty and 28 have ratified.4

* Director, Center for International Human Rights, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago; former Legal Adviser, United Nations Commission
on the Truth for El Salvador. An earlier version of this article appeared as The
ICC's New Legal Landscape: The Need to Expand U.S. Domestic Court Jurisdiction to Prosecute Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity, 23
FORDHAM INT'L LAW J. 378 (1999).

1. See United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 998 [hereinafter ICC Statute].

2. See ICC Statute arts. 5-8. Article 1 provides that the ICC shall have jurisdiction over "the most serious crimes of international concern." The crime of
aggression, and perhaps other crimes, may be added, but not sooner than seven
years after the treaty enters into force, and then only if approved by seven-eighths
of the states parties. See id. arts. 5.1(d), 5.2, 121, 123.

3. See id. art. 126.
4. A continuously updated list can be found on the web site of the nongovernmental Coalition for an ICC, at <http://www.iccnow.org>. "On December
31, 2000, President Clinton signed the treaty, largely to keep the U.S. government
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The United States was one of only seven nations to vote against the
treaty. 5 The ensuing debate within the United States has properly focused
on whether the United States can and should ratify the treaty or, if not,
whether as a non-party the United States should support or oppose the new
court. 6 Largely overlooked, however, are two separate but related ques-

involved in negotiations on the ICC, and despite what he called 'concerns about
significant flaws in the treaty."' Thomas Ricks, U.S. Signs Treaty on War Crimes
Tribunal: Pentagon, Republicans Object to Clinton Move, THE WASH. POST, Jan.
1, 2001, at Al. Secretary of State Colin Powell has since stated that "the United
States in the Bush Administration does not support the International Criminal
Court. President Clinton signed the treaty, but we have no plans to send it forward
to our Senate for ratification." Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, Press Availability with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, Feb. 14, 2001, available at
<http://www.state.gov/secretary> (visited Feb. 18, 2001).
5. There is some dispute about the identities of the seven opposing countries, since the vote was not recorded. Professor Scharf reports that they were
China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, the United States and Yemen. See Michael
Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party States, in THE
UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY

AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

213 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000).

See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 5; COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? (1999); David J. Scheffer, The
United States and The International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12 (1999);
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Policy Perspectives Favoring the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 52 J. INT'L AFF'S 795 (1999); Alfred P. Rubin, Challenging the Conventional Wisdom: Another View of the International Criminal
Court, 52 J. INT'L AFF'S 783 (1999); Douglass Cassel, The Rome Treaty for an
International Criminal Court: A Flawed but Essential First Step, 6 BROWN J.
WORLD AFF's 41 (1999).
A 1999 law prohibits using U.S. funds for the ICC, or giving legal effect to
ICC jurisdiction over U.S. citizens or over acts, persons or property within the
United States, unless the United States becomes a party to the treaty, and bars
extraditions to third countries unless they agree not to surrender U.S. citizens to
the ICC. See 22 U.S.C.S. § 262-1(a) and note (2000), Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-113.
Bills proposing an "American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2000" were
introduced in both the House and Senate in 2000. See H.R. 4654, 106th Congress
(2000); S. 2726, 106th Congress (2000). Among other provisions, they would
deny military aid to States' Parties to the ICC treaty (except major U.S. allies),
demand that the Security Council grant immunity from the ICC for U.S. troops
participating in U.N.military activities, prohibit U.S. cooperation with the ICC,
and authorize the President to use force to free U.S. personnel detained or imprisoned by the ICC. See H.R. 4654, 106th Cong., §§ 4-5, 7-8. The bills were opposed by the Clinton Administration on both policy and legal grounds, as encroaching on presidential powers and undermining the U.S. position in ongoing
negotiations. See, e.g., Ambassador David Scheffer, Statement Before the House
International Relations Committee (July 26, 2000) (visited Nov. 10, 2000)
<http://www.state/gov/wwwpolicyremarks>.
On February 7, 2001, Congressman Ron Paul of Texas introduced House
6.
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tions: (1) Should the existing, incomplete jurisdiction of U.S. courts over
crimes within the ICC Statute be expanded to ensure that such crimes may
also be prosecuted in U.S. courts, under universal jurisdiction or other
bases allowed by international law? and (2) Should the existing, incomplete codification in the United States of crimes within the ICC Statute
likewise be expanded to ensure that they are also crimes under our national law?
This article suggests that the answer to both questions is yes. Regardless of whether the United States ultimately joins the ICC, U.S. courts
should have the jurisdiction and codification necessary to prosecute the
crimes within the ICC Statute. ICC jurisdiction is merely "complementary
to national criminal jurisdictions,"7 whether or not the nations involved
are parties to the ICC. U.S. courts will need jurisdiction coextensive with
that of the ICC, then, in order for the United States to be assured that it
can exercise its right, even as a non-party, to take preemptive jurisdiction
under the ICC Statute.8 In addition, whether or not we join the ICC, our
courts need jurisdiction and laws to ensure that those who commit genocide, crimes against humanity and serious war crimes, and who then come
to or are brought to the United States, can be prosecuted here, in the event
the ICC cannot or does not take jurisdiction.
The imminence of the ICC thus provides both occasion and stimulus to
expand U.S. jurisdictional and criminal laws to cover those crimes within
the ICC's initial mandate. Wholly apart from the ICC, however, U.S. laws
should be updated to provide for
serious crimes, if we are to make
to justice those who commit the
human rights and humanitarian

universal jurisdiction to prosecute such
real our oft-stated commitment to bring
most serious violations of international
law.9 Our courts already have wide-

Concurrent Resolution 23, calling on President Bush to declare that the U.S. does
not intend to ratify the ICC treaty. Press Release, Paul Introduces Resolution Opposing International Criminal Court, Feb. 7, 2001,
available at
<http://www.house.gov/paul/press/press2001> (visited Feb. 18, 2001). See also
U.S. Newswire, American Justice for Americans-Nationwide Petition Drive
Launched to Oppose International Criminal Court, Jan. 23, 2001 available at
LEXIS News Library.
7. ICC Statute art. 1.
8. See ICC Statute arts. 17.1(a)-(c), 18, 20.3.
9. See, e.g., Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Commencement Address, Georgetown Univ. School of Foreign Service, May 29, 1999, (visited Nov.
10, 2000) <http://www.secretary.state.gov/statements/1999> ("If we are to accept
what Milosevic is doing, we would invite further atrocities from him and encourage others to follow his example. That's .... why we strongly support the International War Crimes Tribunal, which earlier this week indicted Milosevic .... ");
Clinton Supports International Criminal Court by Year 2000, AGENCE FRANCE

Sept. 22, 1997 ("'To punish those responsible for crimes against humanity-and to promote justice so that peace endures-we must maintain our strong
PRESSE,
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ranging civil jurisdiction over atrocities, regardless of where they are
committed, whenever the defendant is found in our territory. 0 In criminal
jurisdiction, however, we lag behind such other democracies
as
16
15
14
13
12
Germany,
France,
Denmark,
Canada,
Belgium,
Australia,"

support for the UN's war crimes tribunals ... ,' Clinton said."); The Cambodian
Genocide Justice Act § 572(a), 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (1994) ("Consistent with inter-

national law, it is the policy of the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes against humanity . .. ."); U.S.
Urges War Trials for Serbs, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 15, 1992 ("Eagleburger called Yugoslavia 'a shocking reminder that barbarity exists within our
midst and that we cannot call the new Europe either civilized or secure until we
have developed stronger mechanisms for dealing with this and similar crimes."').
10. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
11.See Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth (1991), 172 C.L.R. 501 (Austl.)
(trial in Australia for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against
Jews in Ukraine).
12. See Luc Reydams, Universal CriminalJurisdiction: The Belgian State of
Affairs, 11 CRIM. L.F. 183 (2000); Theodor Meron, International Criminalization

of InternalAtrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 577 & n.121 (1995) (Belgian arrest
warrant for Rwandan alleged to have massacred other Rwandans in Rwanda, issued under 1993 Belgian law establishing universal jurisdiction over war crimes);
Luc Reydams, International Decisions: Belgian Tribunal of First Instance of
Brussels (InvestigatingMagistrate), November 8, 1998, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 700,

703 (1999) (finding universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, under
customary international law andjus cogens, in case involving criminal complaints
against Chile's General Pinochet). In 1999 Belgium's universal jurisdiction statute was amended to cover genocide and crimes against humanity as well. See id.
at 701 n.7 (citing Loi Relative t la R~pression des Violations Graves de Droit
International Humanitaire, MONITEUR BELGE, Mar. 23, 1999). See also Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium, International Court of Justice Application and Request for Provisional Measures filed Oct. 17, 2000.
13. See Regina v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (Canadian Supreme Court
judgment on trial for crimes against humanity committed against Jews in Hungary); see also Judith Hippler Bello and Irwin Cotler, International Decisions:
Regina v. Finta, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 460 (1996).
14. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, New InternationalLegal Process, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 334, 341 (1999) (citing Director of Public Prosecutions v. T) (Danish trial
of Croatian national for war crimes committed against Bosnians in former Yugoslavia).
15. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, Four File Complaints in FranceAgainst Former
Haitian Dictator, Sept. 10, 1999 (criminal complaints against former Haitian dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier, also noting expansion of French law on crimes against
humanity for actions committed after 1994). In 1995, French law was amended to
authorize universal jurisdiction over crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and in 1996 over crimes
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Brigitte
Stern, InternationalDecisions, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 525, 528 nn.20 & 21 (1999).
But the amendment for Yugoslavia came too late for In re Javor, 1996
Bull.crim., No. 132, at 379, French Cour de Cassation, Criminal Chamber, Mar.
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Israel, 17 Italy,18 the Netherlands, 19 Spain, 20 Switzerland 21 and the United

26, 1996 (no jurisdiction over ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, because Genocide Convention does not provide for universal jurisdiction, customary international law on
crimes against humanity is not explicit enough, Geneva Conventions not internally
implemented by French law, and universal jurisdiction under the Torture Convention exists only when the accused is found in French territory), discussed in Stern,
supra. The Rwanda amendment, however, did come in time to support jurisdiction
in In re Munyeshyaka, 1998 Bull.crim., No. 2, at 3, French Cour de Cassation,
Criminal Chamber Jan. 6, 1998. Initially the Court found no universal jurisdiction
in France over the alleged genocide in Rwanda, but did find jurisdiction over torture because the accused was found in France. Then the 1996 legislation enabled
an expansion of the jurisdiction over the case to cover genocide as well. See
Stern, supra, at 525 & 528 n.20.
In late 1998 French lower court orders found no universal jurisdiction over
crimes against humanity allegedly committed by Chile's General Pinochet, since
they predated the 1994 French law on crimes against humanity. Before 1994
crimes against humanity could be prosecuted in France only for "Nazi crimes set
forth in the Nuremberg Charter." Brigitte Stern, InternationalDecision: French
Tribunalde Grande Instance (Paris), 93 AM. J.INT'L L. 696, 698 (1999).
16. See Christoph J.M. Safferling, InternationalDecisions: Public Prosecutor v. Djajic, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 528 (1998) (affirming universal jurisdiction
in Germany over "grave breaches" of Geneva Convention and Protocol I to try
Bosnian Serb for abetting and attempting murder in Bosnia). "Germany has
taken more than three dozen cases involving [Yugoslav] individuals on its territory." O'Connell, supra note 14 (citing William Drodziak, Bosnian Serb Gets
Life in Massacre of Muslims, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Sept. 27-28, 1997, at 2).
See also 5 INT'L LAW UPDATE 52 (May 1999) (German trial of Bosnian Serb for
genocide in Bosnia); Frank Tiggelaar, Domovina Net, April 27, 1999 (on file
with author) (German trial of Ukrainian-German, who came to Germany in
1994, for murdering inmates in Majdanek concentration camp in Poland during
World War II).
17. See Attorney General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 279, 304 (Israel S.
Ct. 1962) (discussing trial in Israel of former German Nazi official for crimes
against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed
in Europe).
18.

See Terance Neilan, World Briefing: Italy: Argentines Sentenced, N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 7, 2000, at A 12 (generals sentenced in abstentia to life imprisonment,
five other officers to twenty-four years; Italy to seek extradition). See also Derechos Human Rights, Press Release, May 21, 1999 (on file with author) (Italian
court indictment of Argentinian military members for kidnaping, murder and disappearance of Italian citizens in Argentina).
19. See Court Amsterdam, Order of Nov. 20, 2000 (Bouterse case), accessible
at <http://www.rechtspraak.nl/gerechtshof/amsterdam> (visited Feb. 17, 2001);
Marlise Simons, Dutch Court Orders an Investigation of '82 Killings in Suriname,

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000, at A12. The Dutch Court found jurisdiction to investigate
torture leading to death, allegedly committed by former Surinamese military leader
Desi Bouterse against Surinamese citizens in Suriname, based on a retrospective application of the 1989 Dutch statute implementing the Convention Against Torture."
20. See National Tribunal, Criminal Chamber in Plenary, Appellate no. 173/98
- first section, sumario 1/98, Order, Madrid, 5 Nov. 1998 (confirming Spanish juris-
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Kingdom, 22 in ensuring that our
courts have jurisdiction to bring to trial
23
the "enemies of all humanity.,
II. ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
24
LAW

Customary international law permits states to exercise universal jurisdiction over genocide,25 crimes against humanity26 and serious war
diction to try former Chilean head of state Augusto Pinochet for genocide, including
torture, and terrorism committed against Chilean nationals in Chile). The same
Spanish judge who charged General Pinochet has also issued international arrest warrants under theories of universal jurisdiction for genocide, torture and terrorism
against 47 Argentine officers accused of participating in the "dirty war" in that country during 1976-83. See Bruce Zagaris, Mexico Detains Argentine on Spanish Extradition Request for "Dirty War" Atrocities, 16 INT'L HUMAN RTS. & EXTRADITION,
No. 10 (Oct. 2000). At least two are now in custody, one in Spain (Miguel Angel
Cavallo), see id., and the other in Mexico on a Spanish request for extradition. See
Marcela Valente, Rights-Argentina: Justice Nabs Another Dictatorship Official,
INTERNATIONAL PRESS SERVICE, Aug. 8, 2000 (Adolfo Scilingo) available on LEXIS
News Library; see also Tim Weiner, Mexico to Extradite an Argentine Accused of
Genocide to Spain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2001, at A4.
21. See Andreas R. Ziegler, International Decisions: In re G., 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 78 (1998) (Bosnian Serb prosecuted in Switzerland for war crimes committed against civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina).
22. See Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet, 2 W.L.R. 827
(H.L.1999) (confirming United Kingdom jurisdiction to prosecute or extradite to
Spain former Chilean head of state Augusto Pinochet for torture committed against
Chilean nationals in Chile); see also Pursuit of Justice, THE TIMES (London), Apr.
3, 1999 (on British prosecution of Belarussian for war crimes against Jews in Belarus during World War II).
23. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) ("the torturer
has become-like the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis humani generis,
an enemy of all mankind").
24. Adjudicatory jurisdiction, or jurisdiction to prosecute, is used in this article to mean jurisdiction to subject persons who have committed certain crimes to
judicial process. It differs from prescriptive jurisdiction (the authority to make
law applicable) and enforcement jurisdiction (the authority to compel compliance
and to remedy violations). See generally Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under InternationalLaw, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 786 (1988).
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 702 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; Christopher L. Blakesley, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 33, 72 &

n.217 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999); Randall, supra note 24, at 834-37;
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F. Supp. 362, 370 (E.D.La. 1997); Lee A. Steyen, Genocide and the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute: Why the UnitedStates Is in
Breach of Its International Obligations, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 425, 450-61 (1999);
U.S. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON
THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE
CRIME OF GENOCIDE, S. Exec. Rep. No. 98-50, at 12 (1984). But see WILLIAM A.

SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

346, 548 (2000); Stern, supra note
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crimes.27 Such crimes, in other words, are so grave and offensive to all of
humanity, that they may be prosecuted by any state which obtains custody
of the accused, without regard to the nationality of the perpetrator or vic28
tim, location of the crime or other specific link to the prosecuting state.
As used in this article, then, "universal jurisdiction" is exercised when a
state prosecutes crimes committed outside its borders, without regard to
the nationality of the perpetrator or tvictim, the location of the crime or

15 (discussing Javor and Munyeshyaka) (no universal jurisdiction over genocide
prior to French legislation).
26. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Meron, supra note 12, at 568; M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 510-27
(1992); Regina v. Finta, supra note 13; Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth, supra
note 11; Reydams supra note 12; Blakesley, supra note 25, at 71 & n.215. But cf.
Stern, supra note 15 (discussing Javor) (no universal jurisdiction over crimes
against humanity prior to French legislation). See also Bouterse case, supra note
19.
27. See RESTATEMENT § 702; The Law of Land Warfare, in U.S. DEPT.
ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, at 506(b) (1956); Regina v. Finta, supra note 13;
Ziegler, supra note 21; Safferling, supra note 16; Randall, supra note 24, at 81618 (universal jurisdiction over grave breaches of Geneva Conventions); Blakesley,
supra note 25, at 71 & n.214. But cf Stern, supra note 15 (discussing Javor) (no
universal jurisdiction over violations of Geneva Conventions prior to French legislation). A case now before the International Court of Justice challenges the Belgian law asserting universal jurisdiction over "grave violations of international
humanitarian law," as a violation of the sovereignty of another state under art. 2.1
of the United Nations Charter. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium,
Application and Request for Provisional Measures, filed Oct. 17, 2000. The suit,
which requests relief from an international arrest warrant issued by a Belgian
judge against Congo's Acting Foreign Minister, complains that the Belgian law
asserts jurisdiction over acts alleged to have taken place in Congo "without it being alleged that the victims are of Belgian nationality, or that the facts alleged
constitute violations of the security or dignity of the Kingdom of Belgium." International Court of Justice Press Release 2000/32, Oct. 17, 2000 (visited Feb. 15,
2001) <http//:www.icj-cij.org>. On December 8, 2000, by a vote of 15-2, the ICJ
denied Congo's request for provisional measures without reaching the merits.
Order of Dec. 8, 2000, Request for Indication of Provisional Measures. Memorials
are due May 31, 2001. Order of Dec.13, 2000.
28. See generally Randall, supra note 24; RESTATEMENT §§ 404, 423; IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

304-05 (4th ed. 1990).

Universal jurisdiction over extraterritorial offenses need not be, and in practice
often is not, literally "universal," in the sense of covering purely domestic offenses
as well. See, e.g., United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (universal jurisdiction over air hijacking "outside" United States); United
States v. Lin, 101 F.3d 760, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (hostage taking Convention "exempts most purely domestic hostage taking"). Compare, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
1203(b)(1) (1999) (hostage taking outside United States) with 18 U.S.C. §
1203(b)(2) (different provisions for hostage taking inside United States).
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other specific link to the prosecuting state. 29 However, if U.S. courts are
to be equipped to preempt ICC jurisdiction, their jurisdiction over crimes
within the ICC Statute should not be limited to crimes committed outside
the United States,
but should cover crimes committed inside the United
30
States as well.

In addition to universal jurisdiction, international law also recognizes
the right of states to prosecute crimes cominitted within or directly affecting their territories ("territorial" jurisdiction) 3' or, if committed outside
their territories, crimes whose perpetrator is a national of the prosecuting
state ("nationality" or "personality" jurisdiction),32 or whose victim is a
national of the prosecuting state ("passive personality" jurisdiction),33 or
crimes involving an act committed outside their territory which affects
their sovereign interests ("protective" or "effects" jurisdiction).34

III. JURISDICTION OF U.S. COURTS To TRY ICC CRIMES35
The fact that international law authorizes states to exercise certain adjudicatory jurisdiction over international crimes does not mean that U.S.
courts may, without more, exercise such jurisdiction. Under U.S. law our
29. According to Professor Meron, "Indeed, the true meaning of universal
jurisdiction is that international law permits any state to apply its laws to certain
offenses even in the absence of territorial, nationality or other accepted contacts
with the offender or the victim." Theodor Meron, InternationalCriminalizationof
InternalAtrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 570 (1995).
30. See infra Part III.A.
31. See RESTATEMENT § 402 & cmt. b; BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 300.

Territorial jurisdiction can be either "subjective"-when a material element of a
crime is committed within a state's territory - or "objective" - when a crime
committed outside has a significant effect inside the territory, such as a shot fired
from over the border. See generally Blakesley, supra note 25, at 40, 47-50 (subjective), 50-54 (objective).
32. See RESTATEMENT §§ 402(2), 421(2)(d)-(f); BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at
303; Blakesley, supra note 25, at 61-63.
33. See RESTATEMENT § 402 & cmt. g; BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 303-04;

see also S.S. Lotus [1927], P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10. Passive personality jurisdiction may be limited to cases where the prosecuting state has a particularly strong
interest in the crime. See RESTATEMENT § 402 cmt. g. While the United States
traditionally opposed it, e.g., Cutting case, 1887 FOR. REL. 751 (1888) (reported in
John B. Moore, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 232-40 (1906)), passive personality
jurisdiction is "on the ascendancy" today in Europe, and arguably in modern U.S.
anti-terrorist legislation, where it is often mixed with protective jurisdiction. See
Blakesley, supra note 25, at 67, 69-70; infra note 39 and accompanying text.
34. See RESTATEMENT § 402(3); BROWNLIE, supra note 28, at 304; JORDAN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1270
(1996); Blakesley, supra note 25, at 54-61.
35. "U.S. courts" in this article refer to civilian courts established under Article Ill of the Constitution, with full due process safeguards. Military courtsmartial are not considered except where referred to expressly.
PAUST ET AL.,

20011

EMPOWERING U.S. COURTS

courts may exercise only such adjudicatory authority as is conferred upon
them by U.S. law to prosecute crimes codified in U.S. law. 36 With regard
to crimes within the ICC Statute, the express provisions of current U.S.
law provide only partial jurisdictional and codification coverage:
" Genocide is codified by U.S. law, but may be prosecuted by U.S.
courts only if the crime is committed in the U.S. or the offender is a
U.S. national.37
* Crimes against humanity are not codified as such in the United
States. However, if committed in the United States or by members
of the U.S. military, most such crimes would violate domestic
criminal laws or military laws against murder, aggravated assault,
or the like. If committed outside the United States, crimes against
humanity may be prosecuted in U.S. civil courts only if they involve torture
or attempted torture, 38 or certain forms of international
terrorism. 39

36. See RESTATEMENT § 404 reporters' note 1; Randall, supra note 24, at
796 n.66. International law principles do not, as a matter of U.S. domestic law,
constrain Congress from asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, U.S.
courts "presume that Congress does not intend to violate principles of international
law . . . [and] in the absence of an explicit Congressional directive, courts do not
give extraterritorial effect to any statute that violates principles of international
law." United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22
(1963)).
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (1999).
38. U.S. courts have jurisdiction over torture committed outside the United
States if the alleged offender is a U.S. national or "is present in the United States,
irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged offender." Id. §
2340A(b)(2).
39. U.S. courts have jurisdiction over at least the following crimes committed outside the United States, referred to in this article as "certain forms of international terrorism": destruction of aircraft, see 18 U.S.C. § 32 (1999); violence at
international airports, see 18 U.S.C. § 37 (1999); threats and violence against foreign officials, official guests and internationally protected persons, see 18 U.S.C.
§§ 112, 878, 1116 (1999); hostage taking, see 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1999); piracy, see
18 U.S.C. § 1653 (1999); violence against ships, see 18 U.S.C. § 2280 (1999);
violence against fixed maritime platforms, see 18 U.S.C. § 2281 (1999); murder of
U.S. nationals when "intended to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or civilian population," 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332b(a)(1), (e), (g)(1) (1999); terrorism transcending national boundaries which seriously harms persons or property in
the United States, see 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (1999); and air hijacking, see 49 U.S.C.
§ 46502 (1999). See also Blakesley, supra note 24, at 56-57 and nn.125-26. The
bases of jurisdiction vary, as follows:

1. Universal: 18 U.S.C. §§ 32(b)(4); 37(b)(2); 11 2(e)(3); 878(d); 1116(c);
1203(b)(1)(B); 1651; 2280(b)(1)(C), (b)(2); 2281(b)(3); 49 U.S.C. 46502(b)(2)(C).
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War crimes: Under current law some but not all war crimes may be
prosecuted by U.S. civil courts, regardless of whether committed
within or outside the United States, but only when the perpetrator or
victim is a U.S. national or member of the U.S. armed forces, 40 or
when the perpetrator is a former service member or a civilian accompanying the military overseas.41
In addition, military courts appear to have universal jurisdiction over
war crimes to the extent permitted by international law, with the possible
exception of certain cases involving civilians. Military courts seem to
clearly have jurisdiction over war crimes committed by members of the
U.S. military; 42 by persons, including civilians, "in an area of actual
*

2. Nationality: 18 U.S.C. §§ 32(b)(4); 37(b)(2); 112(e) (2); 878(d); 1116(c);
i 203(b)( 1)(A); 2280(b)(i )(A)(iii); 2281 (b)( 1)(B); 49 U.S.C. 46502(b)(2)(B).
3. Passive Personality: 18 U.S.C. §§ 32(b)(4); 37(b)(2); 1203(b)(1)(A);
2280(b)(1)(B); 2281(b)(2); 49 U.S.C. 46502(b)(2)(A).
4. Protective: 18 U.S.C. §§ 112(e)(l); 878(d); 1116(c);1203(b)(!)(C);
2280(b)(1)(A)(l), (b)(3); 2281 (b)(1)(C); 2332b(a)(1), (e), (g)(1).
For decisions upholding universal jurisdiction under such statutes, see, e.g.,
Rezaq, 134 F.3d at 1130-32 (universal jurisdiction over air piracy); and United
States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1090-92 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (universal and passive
personality jurisdiction over hostage taking, and universal jurisdiction over air
hijacking).
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
41. See The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, ch. 212, 114
Stat. 2488 (2000) (to be codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267). The Act, which
passed both chambers of Congress and cleared for Presidential signature on October 26, 2000, in effect grants federal courts jurisdiction over crimes punishable by
more than one year imprisonment, committed by civilian family members, military
contractors, and employees of the military or of military contractors, who accompany the military overseas, regardless of whether they are U.S. citizens, provided
they are not citizens of or "ordinarily resident" in the host nation. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3261(a)(1), 3267 (1)-(2). It also grants jurisdiction over former members of the
military who committed crimes outside the United States while in the military, see
id. § 3261(a)(2), (d)(1), and over military personnel who commit crimes with at
least one other person not in the U.S. military, see id. § 3261(d)(2). The Act does
not deprive military courts of concurrent jurisdiction over war crimes. See id. §
326 1(c). For background on the Act, see Mark E. Eichelman, InternationalCriminal JurisdictionIssues for the United States Military, ARMY LAWYER, Aug. 2000,
at 23. It is not clear whether U.S. military bases and rental property overseas fall
with the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" for
purposes of federal court jurisdiction. Compare U.S. v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166 (9th
Cir. 2000) (finding jurisdiction) with U.S. v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2000)
(finding no jurisdiction).
42. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, general courts-martial
"have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a
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fighting '43 or in occupied enemy territory; 44 by enemy belligerents,
whether military 45 or civilian, 46 even if they are U.S. citizens; 47 and by
citizens of third countries not at war with the United States, at least for
66
grave breaches"
of the Geneva Conventions. 48 Their jurisdiction is less
clear over war crimes by U.S. civilians who are not enemy belligerents,
committed outside zones in which U.S. forces are in battle or occupy en-

military tribunal . . ." 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1994 & Supp. 1998). The Manual for
Courts-Martial United States (1998 ed.), R.C.M. 201(f)(1)(B) (i) is a bit more
precise: "General courts-martial may try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunal for any crime against: (a) The law of war; . .."
See also id. at 202(b)("Nothing in this rule limits the power of general courtsmartial to try persons under the law of war."). This jurisdiction of courts-martial
does not deprive military commissions and other military tribunals of "concurrent
jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of
war may be tried" by them. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
43. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957).
44. See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) (affirming conviction in
1950 of an air force officer's wife, by a U.S. occupation court in the nature of a
military commission, for murder in violation of the German criminal code, committed in the American Zone of Germany); see also Reid, 354 U.S. at 33 n.60.
"The authority for such commissions does not necessarily expire upon cessation of
hostilities or even, for all purposes, with a treaty of peace. It may continue long
enough to permit the occupying power to discharge its responsibilities fully."
Madsen, 343 U.S. at 360 (citations omitted).
45. See, e.g., Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (post-war trial by military commission of former Japanese commander in the Philippines).
46. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (trial of civilian German military
spies in wartime by U.S. military commission). For the history of U.S. military
commissions, see id. at 26-31, and Madsen, 343 U.S. at 346-55. They were originally established to try civilians for war crimes. See WILLIAM WINTHROP,
MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 831-41 (2d ed. 1920).
47. One of the civilians accused in Quirin claimed to be a U.S. citizen, although this was disputed by the government. The Court ruled that citizen or not, if
he was an enemy belligerent, he could be tried by military commission. See
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20, 37-38.
48. Soldiers or nationals of third party states who commit "grave breaches"
of the Geneva Conventions in international conflicts are subject to universal jurisdiction under international law. See generally Meron, supra note 29, at 572-74,
and sources cited in Blakesley, supra note 25, at 71 n.214. Thus U.S. military
courts appear to have jurisdiction to try them. See supra note 42. Universal jurisdiction over other war crimes, including crimes committed in conflicts of a noninternational nature, may be less clearly established by international law. Compare Meron, supra note 28, at 568-71 (non-grave breaches "may fall within universal jurisdiction") with O'Connell, supra note 14, at 341 ("universal jurisdiction
only in the case of the 'grave breaches"'). The International Court of Justice may
soon have an opportunity to clarify this issue, since one of the issues in the pending case filed by Congo against Belgium concerns Belgium's assertion of universal
jurisdiction over violations of Geneva Protocol II, which applies in internal conflicts. See ICJ Press Release 2000/32, supra note 27.
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emy territory 9
Thus, U.S. courts have an uneven, incoherent patchwork of jurisdiction
and codification of crimes within the ICC Statute. In terms of the jurisdictional bases allowed by international law:
•
Universaljurisdiction: U.S. courts have universal jurisdiction over
torture and certain forms of international terrorism, but not over
genocide, war crimes or other crimes against humanity. (In addition, military courts have nearly universal jurisdiction over crimes
against the law of war.)
* Territorialjurisdiction: U.S. courts have jurisdiction based on the
commission of the crime within U.S. territory, regardless of nationality of victim or perpetrator, in cases of genocide, but not in cases
of crimes against humanity or war crimes.

49. U.S. law arguably permits military courts to try all war crimes, wherever
committed and by whomever, including civilians, to the full extent permitted by
international law. Congress has granted them jurisdiction to "try any person who
by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal .

. . ."

10 U.S.C. § 818

(2000); see also supra note 42. The constitutional permissibility of such sweeping
jurisdiction is implied by the broad statement in Quirin that "section 2 of Article
III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments cannot be taken ... to have required that
offenses against the law of war not triable by jury at common law be tried only in
the civil courts." Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40. Most recently, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, which mainly authorizes trials of civilians in civil
courts, see supra note 41, preserves "concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried" by military
courts. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(c).
On the other hand, there is a "deeply rooted and ancient opposition in this
country to the extension of military control over civilians." Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 33 (1957). Military courts cannot try civilians for civil crimes, even insurrection during wartime, in zones where civil courts remain open. Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). Since Quirin
the Supreme Court has further curtailed military court jurisdiction over civilians.
Military courts are now restricted "to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely
essential to maintaining discipline among troops .

. . ."

Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.

11 (1955). Hence they can no longer try civilians who are former service members, for a "'crime'in the constitutional sense," such as murder, committed while
in the military. Reid, 354 U.S. at 31-32 (citing Toth). Nor can they try civilian
dependents accompanying the military overseas for peacetime capital crimes, Reid,
or for non-capital crimes, Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234
(1960); nor civilian employees accompanying the military overseas, either for
capital crimes, Grisham v. Hogan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960), or non-capital crimes,
McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
Arguably Reid "is now regarded as establishing that nonmilitary personnel
are never within the reach" of military courts in peacetime. Kinsella, 361 U.S. at
249, 252 (Harlan & Frankfurter, JJ., dissenting). Now that civil courts have jurisdiction over certain war crimes, would the Supreme Court preclude military courts
from trying civilians for those war crimes? See note 41 supra. The answer remains
unclear.
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*

Nationality jurisdiction: U.S. courts have jurisdiction over perpetrators who are U.S. nationals, regardless of where the crime is
committed, if they commit genocide, certain war crimes, or certain
forms of international terrorism, but not if they commit other war
crimes or other crimes against humanity.
" Passive personality jurisdiction: U.S. courts have jurisdiction because the victim is a U.S. national, regardless of where the crime is
committed, in cases of certain war crimes or certain forms of international terrorism, but not in cases of genocide, other war crimes or
other crimes against humanity.
* Protective jurisdiction: U.S. courts can prosecute certain forms of
international terrorism committed overseas, based on their effects
on victims or property in the U.S. or on U.S. sovereignty interests.
They can also prosecute crimes committed by persons accompanying U.S. forces overseas, based on the need to safeguard military
security, discipline and morale.
In addition to the foregoing express jurisdiction, U.S. courts have a
limited, implied extraterritorial jurisdiction. While there is a presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal law, and application
overseas is not generally allowed "unless such an intent is clearly manifested" by Congress,5" at least two exceptions could allow U.S. courts to
try certain crimes committed in the course of genocide, war crimes and
crimes against humanity outside our borders.
One exception applies only to protective jurisdiction: Where a criminal
statute aims to protect the U.S. government from threats "not logically
dependent on their locality," extraterritorial application may be implied. 5'
For example, foreign nationals who bomb American embassies, thereby
killing people, can be prosecuted in the United States for such crimes as
destroying U.S. property, 52 causing death in the process, 5 3 and using explosives to commit a felony,5 4 even though there is no explicit mention of
extraterritoriality in the codification of such crimes. 55

50. United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

(quoting Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993)).
51. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922); United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1317 (1lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137 (1985);
Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 193-94.
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1) (1994).
53. See id. § 844(f)(3).
54. See id. § 844(h).
55. See Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 198-99. Other usually domestic crimes
of violence for which extraterritorial application has been implied include, e.g.,
murder and attempted murder of U.S. officers and employees, 18 U.S.C. § 1114,
Benitez, supra note 51, 741 F.2d at 1317, and Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 202-03;

conspiracy to attack U.S. property and to kill U.S. nationals in the process, 18
U.S.C. § 844(n), 92 F. Supp. 2d at 199-201; using a firearm during a crime of vio-
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The other exception applies to all bases of jurisdiction under international law. It permits U.S. courts to try "ancillary" crimes committed
abroad-such as attempt, conspiracy or accessory-which are "presumed
to have extraterritorial effect if the underlying substantive statute is first
determined to have extraterritorial effect., 56 Thus, to the extent genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and lesser included crimes may be
tried in U.S. courts, so too, may those ancillary crimes over which the ICC
also has jurisdiction.5 7
The current, ad hoc accumulation of U.S. jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes within the ICC Statute leaves unsettling gaps and inconsistencies.
For example:
" Pol Pot: In 1997 Cambodia briefly requested the U.N. to establish
an international criminal tribunal to try Pol Pot for his slaughter of
more than a million Cambodians. Since the Chinese would veto a
U.N. tribunal in the Security Council, the U.S. tried to have Pol Pot
put on trial in another country. But the United States had no laws
granting U.S. courts jurisdiction to prosecute his crimes against
humanity. The State Department was reduced to imploring Canada,
Denmark, Israel and Spain, all of which have such laws, to take jurisdiction, but was turned down.58 Pol Pot was never credibly
prosecuted for his monstrous crimes.59
* Saddam Hussein's Lieutenants: In 1999 the United States reportedly
pressed Austria to arrest and prosecute a senior Iraqi official who
came to that country for medical treatment. But the official fled to
Iraq before any arrest. 60 Suppose he had come to the United States.
Our courts would have had no jurisdiction to prosecute him for
lence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), 92 F. Supp. 2d at 201; killing during an attack on a
federal facility with a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 930(c), 92 F. Supp. 2d at 201-02; and
destroying national defense material or premises with intent to injure the national
defense, 18 U.S.C. § 2155, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 203-04.
56. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (citations omitted).
57. The ICC Statute criminalizes the following ancillary conduct when
committed with respect to substantive crimes within ICC jurisdiction: Art. 25 (b)
(orders, solicits or induces), (c) (aids, abets or otherwise assists), (d) (contributes

to the commission or attempted commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose, either with the aim of furthering their criminal act or
purpose, or with knowledge of the group's intention to commit a crime), and (f)
(attempts).
58. See William Schabas, Follow-up to Rome: Preparingfor Entry into
Force of the International Criminal Court Statute, 20 HuM. RTS. L.J. 157, 160
(1999); Heather Scoffield, Canada Looks for U.N. Sanction on Pol Pot Trial, THE
HERALD

(Glasgow), June 25, 1997; Stephen Marks, Elusive Justicefor the Victims

of the Khmer Rouge, 52 J.INT'L AFF. 691, 701-03 (1999).
59. See generally sources cited supra note 58.
60. See John Lancaster, U.S. Steps Up Efforts to Prosecute Top Iraqis,
WASH. POST,

Oct. 28, 1999, at A26.
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crimes against humanity against the Iraqi people or the Kurds. Only
if he could be charged for torture, certain forms of international terrorism, or for war crimes against U.S. nationals or soldiers, would
U.S. civil courts have jurisdiction to prosecute him. Nor could U.S.
civil courts prosecute him for war crimes against the Kuwaitis. (A
military court could try him, but only for war crimes. However, an
American military trial of an Iraqi officer, rightly or wrongly, would
be widely viewed as lacking independence and impartiality.)
Genocide in Rwanda: Foreigners who commit genocide and then
come to the United States cannot be prosecuted here for genocide,
no matter how many people they may have killed. Consider, for
example, Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, a Rwandan clergyman allegedly
responsible for massacres of Tutsis in Rwanda during 1994, who
later fled to Texas where he was apprehended. 6' United States
courts have no jurisdiction to prosecute him for genocide. Fortunately, the U.N. has established an ad hoc international tribunal for
the Rwandan genocide.62 But what if he came from Burundi, where
there is also tribal violence, but no international tribunal?
Violence against US. nationals overseas: Even if U.S. nationals are
victimized by an overseas genocide, the result is the same: U.S.
courts have no jurisdiction to prosecute foreigners for genocide
committed overseas. If the genocide involves torture or happens to
take place in a war zone, the perpetrators could be prosecuted here
for torture or for some, but not all, war crimes. But if it were committed against private citizens in peacetime, and the victims were
summarily executed and not tortured, U.S. courts might have no jurisdiction to prosecute for any crime. Thus, for example, even if the
irregulars who recently killed American tourists at a nature reserve
in Uganda were caught in New York, U.S. courts might have no jurisdiction to prosecute them for the murders.6 3

61. See generally Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1135 (2000). See also Deborah Tedford, War-crime Surrender I"
in U.S., Rwandan Pastor Accused of Genocide, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar.
25, 2000, at A39.
62. See Ntakirutimana, 184 F.3d. at 421 n.1.
63.

See Two Americans Among Eight Slain in Uganda Forest, L.A. TIMES,

Mar. 3, 1999 at Al. The killers could be prosecuted for terrorist murders of U.S.
citizens, but only if it could be proved that their intent was to "coerce, intimidate,

or retaliate against a government or civilian population." 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a)(l),
(e), (g)(1). Conceivably they could be prosecuted for war crimes, but prosecutors
would have to establish that this area of Uganda, which was otherwise at peace,
was a war zone. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Int'l Crim. Trib. for former Yugoslavia
Case No. IT-94- I-A, Judgment of July 15, 1999 (Appeals Chamber).
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IV. THE NEED To CLOSE THE GAP
The foregoing examples, unfortunately, can easily be multiplied. As
they illustrate, there is a need to close the gap between U.S. and ICC jurisdiction to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and serious war
crimes. For the reasons described below, this gap should be closed, regardless of whether the United States ultimately chooses to join the ICC,
and independently of whether, in the meantime, the United States supports, opposes or takes a neutral posture toward the ICC.
At least in the short run, the United States will not ratify the treaty establishing the ICC.64 Even so, the mere existence of an ICC, with or without U.S. participation, alters the legal landscape in ways that argue for
granting U.S. courts universal jurisdiction over crimes within the ICC
Statute.
A. PreemptingICC JurisdictionOver US. Nationals
Under the Rome Statute the ICC will have jurisdiction to prosecute nationals of Non-States Parties for crimes committed on the territory of
States Parties,6 5 or on the territory of states which consent to the ICC's
jurisdiction. 66 However, the ICC may exercise this jurisdiction only on a
"complementary" basis, meaning that it must defer to national prosecutions, including those by Non-States Parties.67
Thus, even if the United States does not join the ICC, U.S. nationals

64. See supra note 4.
65. See ICC Statute art. 12.2(a). Situations involving crimes by nationals of
non-states parties may also be referred to the ICC by the U.N. Security Council.
See id. art. 13 (b). However, the United States could veto referrals involving U.S.
nationals.
66. ICC Statute art. 12.3 permits non-states parties to accept ICC jurisdiction "with respect to the crime in question." The United States properly objected
that this might permit one-way consent, i.e., a dictator could consent to ICC juris-

diction over an alleged crime by a U.S. soldier, without exposing his own actions
to ICC jurisdiction. See Ruth Wedgwood, Speech Three; Improve the International Criminal Court, in TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra
note 6, at 69. The U.S. concern was resolved by Rule 44.2 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which provides that an article 12.3 acceptance "has as a consequence the acceptance of jurisdiction with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5 of relevance to the situation and the provisions of Part 9, and any rules thereunder concerning States Parties, shall apply." Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum, Finalized Text of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, U.N.Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.1, July 12, 2000
(visited Nov. 10, 2000) <http:/www.un.org/law/icc>. More broadly, the United
States also objects that ICC jurisdiction over nationals of non-states parties violates international law. Professor Scharf argues persuasively that this objection is
not well-founded. See generally Scharf, supra note 5.
67. See ICC Statute arts. 1, 17.1(a)-(c), 18, 19.2(b), 20.3.
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will remain subject to ICC jurisdiction in some circumstances. However,
the United States can preempt ICC jurisdiction by investigating the case
itself and, if warranted, prosecuting its national.68 If the United States
investigates but then determines that no prosecution is warranted, ICC
jurisdiction is still ousted, unless the ICC determines that the U.S. decision "resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the . . . [United
States] genuinely to prosecute., 69 Tests for "unwillingness or inability"
are strictly defined in the statute,7 ° making it highly unlikely that the ICC
would take jurisdiction if the United States has already done so.
The United States' ability to prosecute is thus key to avoiding exercise
of ICC jurisdiction over U.S. nationals or over other cases where the
United States has an interest in investigation or prosecution. But as noted
above, current U.S. law does not grant U.S. courts jurisdiction to prosecute crimes against humanity (except for torture and certain forms of international terrorism) committed outside the United States. Nor do U.S.
courts presently have jurisdiction to prosecute all war crimes committed
against foreigners outside the United States, by U.S. nationals who are not
members of the armed forces.71 In either case, U.S. courts would be
helpless to preempt ICC jurisdiction over U.S. nationals, unless U.S. law
is amended to expand the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
But how can U.S. court jurisdiction to prosecute crimes against humanity be expanded, when U.S. law does not codify crimes against humanity
as crimes? Conceivably, jurisdiction could be conferred over a range of
existing U.S. crimes when committed by U.S. nationals abroad.72 But
even if such extraterritorial jurisdiction were granted over a host of common crimes-a dubious extension of ordinary criminal jurisdiction-the
68. See id. arts. 17.1(a)-(b), 18.
69. Id. art. 17.1(b).
70. Unwillingness can be found only if the ICC determines that the decision
"was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility," or there was an unjustified delay or lack of independence or impartiality in the proceedings, in circumstances "inconsistent with an intent to bring the
person concerned to justice." Id. art. 17.2(a)-(c).
Inability exists only if the ICC finds a "total or substantial collapse or unavailability of [the] national judicial system,..." Id. art. 17.3.
71. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2441 (b)-(c) (Law. Co-op. 1993 & Supp. 2000). For
those war crimes defined in subsection (c), U.S. courts have jurisdiction over all
U.S. nationals acting abroad. But as discussed below, other war crimes are not
covered by subsection (c), for which U.S. nationals acting abroad, who are not
members of the armed forces, are currently beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
72. Crimes against humanity under the ICC Statute involve widespread or
systematic attacks directed against a civilian population, by means of murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer, unlawful imprisonment, torture, rape and other sexual violence, discriminatory persecutions, enforced disappearances, apartheid, and other inhumane acts. See ICC Statute art.
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result would not necessarily enable U.S. courts to preempt ICC jurisdiction, because the elements of common crimes differ from those of crimes
against humanity.7 3 The simplest and surest way to give U.S. courts preemptive jurisdiction over ICC proceedings against U.S. nationals is to give
U.S. courts jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and the other crimes
defined in the ICC Statute, when committed by U.S. nationals abroad.
B. ProtectingOther U.S. Interests
The foregoing would require granting U.S. courts nationality jurisdiction over the crimes in the ICC Statute. But there may also be other categories of crimes which the United States has an interest in prosecuting, for
which current law does not afford jurisdiction. These include crimes
against humanity committed in the United States, which would require
territorialjurisdiction; genocide, crimes against humanity, and certain war
crimes committed against U.S. nationals abroad, which would require passive personalityjurisdiction; and such crimes abroad affecting U.S. sovereign interests, which would require protective jurisdiction.
There are also crimes which may not fit in any of these categories, although the United States may have a strong foreign policy interest in asserting jurisdiction. As suggested by the examples in the preceding section, the United States may wish to be in a position to prosecute the likes
of Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein and Rwandan genocidaires, even for crimes
not directly involving the United States or its nationals. To do so U.S.
courts would require universal jurisdiction (which they already have for
torture and certain forms of international terrorism), enabling them to try
such criminals who may be found in or lawfully brought to the United
States .7"

73. Article 17.1(a) ousts the ICC of jurisdiction when "the case" is being investigated by a state. Would a U.S. "case" for mass murder be the same as an ICC

"case" for crimes against humanity? Article 18 requires that the ICC prosecutor,
before beginning an investigation, notify all states which "would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned." If the "crimes concerned" are crimes
against humanity, and the United States does not codify such crimes, can it be said
that the United States would "normally" exercise jurisdiction over them? Article

20.3 bars ICC trials of persons who have already been tried by another court for
the "same conduct." Is the "conduct" tried in a U.S. murder case the same as that
in an ICC case for crimes against humanity? The answers are not clear. See cf
Rezaq, 134 F.3d at 1128-30 (Maltese conviction for murder and hostage taking

does not bar subsequent U.S. prosecution for air piracy because some elements of
offenses differ); United States v. Rashed, 83 F. Supp. 2d 96, 103-04 (D.D.C. 1999)

(Greek conviction for aircraft bombing does not bar U.S. prosecution for same acts
because some elements differ).
74. Universal jurisdiction generally may be exercised by U.S. courts even
though a defendant's presence in the United States is secured involuntarily. See
Rezaq, 134 F.3d at 1130-32; Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1090-92. U.S. courts recognize
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In short, if the United States wishes to have the option of preempting
ICC jurisdiction in the full range of cases in which we may have investigative or prosecutorial interest, U.S. courts should be granted universal
jurisdiction over the crimes in the ICC Statute.
Some might object that such broad universal jurisdiction could entangle
the United States in unwanted foreign policy disputes. The objection,
however, is unwarranted. The executive branch would retain prosecutorial
discretion in each case over whether to investigate or, instead, to allow the
ICC to assume jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction of U.S. courts75over ICC
crimes would add flexibility, not rigidity, to U.S. foreign policy.
One might further object that the international trend toward expanding
universal jurisdiction exacerbates the potential for conflict between states
asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction and states asserting sovereignty over
crimes committed on their territory, and that the United States should
avoid encouraging such a trend. But this, too, goes more to the exercise of
universal jurisdiction than to its statutory authorization. As a matter of
sound policy, the United States ought not to exercise universal jurisdiction
when states with territorial or other direct links to a crime prosecute effectively and fairly, or when the ICC is able and willing to take the case.
But in situations where neither other states nor the ICC can or will do the
job, the United States ought to have the option to ensure that the likes of a
Pol Pot do not escape justice.
C. FightingImpunity
In addition to preempting ICC jurisdiction, protecting or punishing U.S.
nationals, protecting U.S. territory and sovereign interests, and providing
the United States added foreign policy flexibility, universal jurisdiction in
U.S. courts is also important to make real the U.S. commitment to end

exceptions where the transfer to the United States would violate a treaty, see
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664 (1992), and possibly in "very
limited" cases where the person detained is subjected to "torture, brutality, and
similar outrageous conduct." Rezaq, 134 F.3d at 1130 (quoting Yunis, 924 F.2d at
1092-93 and United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.
1975)). More broadly, in this author's view, if U.S. courts are to uphold the rule
of law and human rights by prosecuting crimes within the ICC Statute, their jurisdiction should be limited to cases where a defendant's presence in the United
States is secured by lawful means.
75. Two persistent critics of civil suits to enforce international human rights
in U.S. courts, on the ground that such suits, controlled by private plaintiffs, may
interfere with U.S. foreign policy, distinguish criminal prosecutions, controlled by
the executive, which has the "duty, expertise and discretion to accommodate such
foreign relations concerns." Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, Pinochet and
International Human Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2158-59, 2173,
2181 (1999).
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impunity for those who commit genocide, crimes against humanity and
serious war crimes. 76 Like our European allies who have recently prosecuted foreign nationals found in their territories for such crimes committed
in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 7 the United States must be in a position to do
its part to bring international outlaws to justice.
It might be objected that the advent of the ICC renders expanded U.S.
jurisdiction over such crimes unnecessary. But not all such crimes can or
should be prosecuted by the ICC:
First, the ICC's jurisdiction will be prospective only. 78 Thus, it cannot
prosecute crimes committed in the 1990s, for example, no matter how
horrendous and demanding of punishment.
Even for future crimes, the ICC may be unable to take jurisdiction. In
cases initiated by the prosecutor or by States' Parties, its jurisdiction may
79
be blocked by lack of consent by the state of nationality or territoriality.
This will make it difficult for the ICC to prosecute rulers who repress their
own people, since in such cases the states of nationality and territoriality
are one and the same, and the ruler will not likely consent to his own
prosecution. In cases initiated by the Security Council, referral to the ICC
may be vetoed. 80 Moreover, even when the ICC does gain jurisdiction, its
resources will be limited. Both for this reason, and because the ICC is
intended to focus on only the most serious cases, there may be situations
where it prosecutes only the most senior commanders, leaving lower
ranking offenders-who may nonetheless have committed heinous
crimes-for prosecution by national courts. 1
For all these reasons, the ICC cannot be expected to do the whole job of
bringing to justice those who commit atrocities.
Nor can rogue regimes be counted upon to prosecute their own leaders.
If impunity for the worst international crimes is to be reined in, then, the
potential for the United States and other democracies to exercise universal

76.
77.

See supra note 9.
See supra notes 12, 14, 15, 16 & 21.

78. See ICC Statute art. 11.
79.
80.

See id. arts. 12.2, 12.3.
See id. art. 13(b).

81. See ICC Statute art. 1 (stating that the International Criminal Court shall
have power to exercise jurisdiction over "the most serious crimes of international
concern"), 17.1 (d) (stating that the court shall determine the case is inadmissible if
it is not of "sufficient gravity"), 53.2(c) (explaining the prosecutor may conclude
there is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution because, among other factors, there
is not sufficient gravity). Explaining that "[i]nvestigative resources must ... be
applied . . . to high-level civilian, police and military leaders," chief prosecutor

Carla del Ponte declined to try nine Serbs arrested in Kosovo before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adding that local courts would
try cases not taken to The Hague. U.N. War Crimes ProsecutorSets Out Kosovo
Strategy, REUTERS, Sept. 29, 1999 (on file with author).
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and other extraterritorial jurisdiction will remain an important option,
notwithstanding the advent of the ICC.
Expanding U.S. court jurisdiction to provide universal jurisdiction over
crimes in the ICC Statute would be consistent with recent trends, in both
the United States and other democracies, to expand jurisdiction over such
crimes. The United States has recently expanded its extraterritorial jurisdiction over genocide (1988),82 torture (1994),83 certain forms of international terrorism (1996),84 and war crimes (1997 and 2000).85 As noted
earlier, other democracies have recently exercised universal jurisdiction
over such crimes. They are now likely to expand their jurisdictional statutes even further to reach the full range of crimes in the ICC Statute. 6
In anticipation of an ICC, then, a range of U.S. national interests, reinforced by values shared by the United States and other democracies in
fighting impunity for atrocities, calls for granting U.S. courts expanded,
preferably universal jurisdiction, over crimes within the ICC Statute.
V. LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS

One simple way to close the gap would be to enact a new section of the
U.S. criminal code, granting federal courts universal jurisdiction over
genocide, serious war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in
the ICC Statute.87 The ICC statutory definitions should not be incorporated by reference; 88 their language should be repeated verbatim or sub-

82. See Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100606, § 1, 102 Stat. 3045 (codified in 18 U.S.C.S. § 1091 (1994)).
83. See Act of Apr. 30, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-236, Title V, Part A, § 506(a),
108 Stat. 463 (codified in 18 U.S.C.S. § 2340A (1991 & Supp. 2000)).
84. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 24, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, Title VII, Subtitle
A, § 702(a), 110 Stat. 1291 (codified in 18 U.S.C.S. § 2332(b) (1991 & Supp.

2000)) (acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries).
85. See Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-18, Title V, § 583, 111 Stat.
2436 (codified in 18 U.S.C.S. § 2441 (1993 & Supp. 2000)). See also supra note
41.

86. See Schabas, supra note 58, at 157 (advising that, "in keeping with the
principle of complementarity (preamble: "Recalling that it is the duty of every

State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes"), the State's legislation should enable it to exercise its domestic jurisdiction over the crimes and individuals within the jurisdiction of the Court.").
87. See ICC Statute arts. 6, 7, 8. Under its power conferred by article 1,
section 8, clause 10 of the U.S. Constitution to "define and punish . . . Offenses
against the Law of Nations," Congress has authority to codify in rnational crimes.
See generally Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power
to "Define and Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 447 (2000). Article III, section I grants Congress the power to establish lower federal courts and to define their jurisdiction.
88. Incorporation by reference would arguably suffice for trials before mili-
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stantially, together with the "elements of offenses" under the ICC Statute,
which the United States took the lead in drafting and which have now
been adopted in a form satisfactory to the United States. 9
Some such approach is required for crimes against humanity, since they
are not codified by current U.S. law. For genocide and war crimes, an
alternative would be to make simple amendments to existing legislation.
The following sections address both technical and policy questions for
each category of crimes:
A. Genocide
An alternative approach is simply to expand the current statutory jurisdiction of U.S. courts over genocide (territorial and nationality) to make it
universal. 90 Although differences would remain between the definition of
the crime under U.S. law and the ICC Statute, in most cases these would
not impair U.S. ability either to take preemptive jurisdiction over a case,
or to prosecute genocide. 9'
B. War Crimes
An alternative approach here, too, is to expand the current statutory jurisdiction of U.S. courts over war crimes (nationality and passive personality) to make it universal.92 Since U.S. military courts already have

tary courts of military personnel and enemy belligerents for war crimes, see Ex
Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1942), but would not meet the more exacting
standards required for trials of civilians in civil courts. See Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733, 752-57 (1974).
89.

Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal

Court, Addendum, Finalized Text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N.Doc.
PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2, July 6, 2000. The United States "led the negotiations on the Elements of Crimes and provided the working draft for those negotiations." Ambassador David Scheffer, Statement Before the Congressional Human
Rights Caucus, Sept. 15, 2000, at I (visited Nov.
10, 2000)
<http://www.state.gov/policy remarks>. The United States was "pleased to join
the consensus on them ....

We strongly believe ...

[they] will stand the test of

time, as they are consistent with customary international law and international
standards of due process." Ambassador David Scheffer, Statement Before the
Sixth Committee of the U.N.General Assembly, Oct. 18, 2000 (visited Nov. 10,
2000) <.http://www.state.gov/policyremarks>. See also ICC Statute art. 9; see
generally Schabas, supra note 58.
90. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1091(d)(1)-(2) (1999).

91. For example, the U.S. statutory definition of genocide requires intent to
destroy the target group in whole or "substantial part," id. § 1091(a), whereas the
ICC definition states merely in whole or "in part." ICC Statute art. 6. This difference is unlikely to make much difference in practice.
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(b) (1999).
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nearly universal jurisdiction over war crimes (except possibly when committed by U.S. citizens in certain circumstances), 93 no extension of sovereignty is required to confer such jurisdiction on civilian courts as well.
Moreover, because of their stronger assurances of independence and impartiality, 94 granting civilian federal courts universal jurisdiction over war
crimes would be more likely to yield judgments perceived internationally
as fair and just.
Expanding jurisdiction in this manner, however, would not be enough.
The war crimes subject to U.S. court jurisdiction also need to be expanded. The U.S. war crimes law currently criminalizes only grave
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and violations of common article 3 of those Conventions and of certain articles of the Annex to the 1907
Hague Convention IV. 95
The law provides that U.S. courts will have jurisdiction over other war
crimes - violations of the 1977 Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, and of the 1996 Protocol on mines, booby-traps and other devices
96
- only once the United States becomes a party to those Protocols.
However, the ICC has jurisdiction over significant provisions of Protocols
I and 11. 97 There is no need to make a grant of similar jurisdiction to U.S.
courts dependent upon U.S. ratification, which has been opposed for other
reasons.9The
Protocol provisions adopted by the ICC Statute are largely
incorporated in the customary law of war. 99 They have been further specified by the "elements of crimes" initially drafted by the United States and
now adopted in a form satisfactory to the United States.'00 U.S. courts

93.
94.

See supra notes 42-49.

95.
96.

See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35-39 (1957).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c) (Supp. III 1997).
See id. § 2441(c)(1), (3)-(4).

97.

See ICC Statute art. 8 (b) (violations in international armed conflict, cor-

responding to Protocol I and to the Hague regulations) and 8(e) (violations in

armed conflicts not of an international character, corresponding to Protocol II); see
also Schabas, supra note 58, at 164-65.
98. See Michael Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Nationals of NonParty States: A Critique of the U.S. Position(forthcoming in 63 LAW & CONTEMP.

PROBS. at 27-28) (manuscript on file with author).
99. See Statement of the U.S. in U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 at 15, reprinted in 2
VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF,
AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 451 (1995)

(Protocol I); Int. Crim.Trib. for former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Tadic case,
Decision of 2 October 1995, IT Doc. IT-94-I-AR72, at 63 (Protocol II). See generally Scharf, supra note 98, at 26-3 1.
100. See supra note 89. One provision that caused concern was the prohibition of the "transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its
own civilian population into the territory it occupies . . . " ICC Statute art.
8.2(b)(viii). Professor Wedgwood suggested that this be interpreted to extend "no
further than the existing Geneva Conventions," in order to leave the question of
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should be given universal jurisdiction over these crimes as thus defined.
C. Crimes Against Humanity
Crimes against humanity, on the other hand, are not currently codified
in U.S. criminal law. The simplest approach is to add a new statutory
.provision incorporating the text of article 7 of the ICC Statute and the corresponding elements of crimes. The crimes against humanity in the ICC
Statute-widespread or systematic attacks on a civilian population, by
means of murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible
transfer of population, unlawful imprisonment, torture, rape or sexual
violence, discriminatory persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid,
or other similar inhumane acts-are not problematic for the United
States.'
D. Responsibility of CivilianSuperiors
To the extent expanded U.S. court jurisdiction over ICC crimes is designed to ensure that U.S. courts can take cases that might otherwise go to
the ICC, it would be prudent for U.S. law, like the ICC Statute, to hold
civilian superiors criminally responsible for genocide, war crimes and
crimes against humanity, when committed by subordinates under their
"effective authority and control, as a result of [their] failure to exercise
control properly over such subordinates," where the superiors are at
fault. 0 2 Unless the United States can prosecute civilians in such circumstances, they will be vulnerable to potential prosecution before the ICC.
Since military superiors are already bound by command
responsibility, no
03
additional legislation is needed for the U.S. military.
VI. CONCLUSION

Genocide, crimes against humanity and serious war crimes, wherever

Israeli settlements to peace negotiations. Wedgwood, supra note 66, at 70. The
final Elements of Crimes specify that "[t]he term 'transfer' needs to be interpreted
in accordance with the relevant provisions of international humanitariaj law."
Elements of Crimes, supra note 89, art. 8(2)(b)(viii).
101. See ICC Statute art. 7.1; see also Scheffer, supra note 89.
102. ICC Statute art. 28.2 holds such superiors criminally responsible only if

three further conditions are met: "(a) The superior either knew, or consciously
disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes; (b) The crimes concerned activities that
were within the effective responsibility and control of the superior; and (c) The
superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her
power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution."
103. See U.S. DEP'T ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 27-10, at 501 (1956).
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they may be committed, offend all nations and all peoples. Beginning in
the last decade of the 20th century democracies, including the United
States, have increasingly assumed and acted upon commitments to ensure
that perpetrators of these crimes do not escape justice. U.S. legislation to
permit our courts to prosecute such offenses, even when committed outside our borders, has steadily expanded. European democracies have
prosecuted foreign nationals for committing these crimes in far away
places, against far away peoples.
One might anticipate that an International Criminal Court would reduce
the need for national courts to take such cases. On the contrary, the ICC
Statute makes the role of national courts even more important. In part this
is due to national self-interest. Under the ICC Statute, whether or not the
United States joins the ICC, the United States is entitled to preempt the
ICC in cases over which the United States has jurisdiction. The United
States cannot exercise that right, however, unless Congress grants our
courts jurisdiction to hear those cases. Their present, uneven and incomplete jurisdiction falls well short of what they need.
Expanding the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in such cases serves not only
national interests, but also national values. This is an instance where our
interests and values happily coincide. If the United States is to make good
on its shared commitment to fight impunity for these most serious international crimes, U.S. courts must have the necessary jurisdiction to do the
job. Because of its own statutory and resource limitations, the ICC will
not be able to bring to justice all who commit crimes within its jurisdiction- especially dictators who oppress their own people. U.S. and other
national courts, then, must be available alternatives. Only then will the
executive branch have the legal capacity to do its part in the fight against
impunity. Only then will repressive rulers in the next century face ever
higher odds of being held to account for their crimes against humanity.

